Honourable Members, the House will recall that on Tuesday, 1st July, 2025, when the House had just finished considering Urgent Matters Without Notice, Mr Mubita Anakoka Member of Parliament for Luena Parliamentary Constituency, raised a Point of Order premised on the powers of Parliament to legislate as provided for under Part 14 of the National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders, 2024, and in particular Standing Order 108. The Point of Order was raised in the following terms:

 

“Thank you very much, Madam Speaker, for the opportunity.

 

Madam Speaker, the people of Luena, as you know, do not rise on Points of Order unless they are compelled to do so. In this case, the Point of Order is also contemporaneous. 

 

Madam Speaker, the Point of Order I am rising on is anchored on the entire Chapter 14 of the Standing Orders, but with specific reference to Standing Order 108. 

 

However, as a way of anchoring what I want to raise as a Point of Order, allow me just to highlight that Article 62 of the Constitution establishes Parliament and Article 62(2) expressly vests legislative powers in this Parliament. 

 

Article 77 further empowers this House to regulate its own procedures and processes. As part of that self regulation, this House has Standing Orders. It is in this respect that I refer to the entire Chapter 14 of the National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders, 2024. Standing Order 108 specifically makes reference to Article 79, which is specifically about the procedures and processes to be followed when this House seeks to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

 

Madam Speaker, while this House was engaged in a process, as prescribed in, and empowered by, the Constitution in Article 79, we closed the week with some breaking news coming from another arm of the Government in the form of the Constitutional Court, which pronounced that the processes that were under way in this House were unconstitutional. 

 

Madam Speaker, is this House in order to keep quiet when, while it was in the process of discharging its constitutional mandate, another arm of the Government declared the process unconstitutional? This usurpation of powers on such a serious issue has the potential to impact negatively the constitutional order of this country in terms of the separation of powers. Is this House, therefore, in order to keep quiet when there is such a pronouncement, which has far-reaching consequences in terms of the ability of this House to execute its constitutional mandate?

 

Madam Speaker, I seek your serious ruling on this matter.”

 

In my immediate response, I reserved my ruling in order to study the matter. I have since studied the matter and will now render my ruling. 

 

Honourable Members, the Point of Order raises the issue of one Arm of Government interfering with the operations or functioning of another Arm of Government.

 

Before I delve into the merits of this Point of Order, I wish to inform the House that, ordinarily, a Point of Order raised against the House would not be sustained. This position is fortified by the ruling of the erstwhile Speaker, Rt Honourable Justice Dr Patrick Matibini, SC, on a Point of Order raised by Dr M Malama, the then Member of Parliament for Kanchibiya Parliamentary Constituency, against the House for allowing the exhibition of “political colours” (Daily Parliamentary Debates of Tuesday, 27th February, 2018). In that Ruling, Speaker Matibini, SC stated as follows: 

 

“I wish to begin by guiding the House that a Point of Order cannot be raised against the House. This is because the purpose of a Point of Order is to draw the Speaker’s attention to a breach of the rules of the House by a Member.”

However, given the significance of the issue raised in the Point of Order by Mr M Anakoka, MP, I exercised the discretionary powers vested in me by Standing Order 141 to allow the Point of Order, and I will now proceed to render my ruling. 

 

Honourable Members, the background to the Point of Order by Mr M Anakoka, MP, is that on Friday, 27th June, 2025, the Constitutional Court rendered a Judgment in the case of Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila Vs the Attorney-General 2025/CCZ/009. In that case, the petitioners, being unhappy with the ongoing Constitutional Reform process, filed a petition in the Constitutional Court seeking the Court’s determination of the following questions:

 

(i) whether Article 128 of the Constitution as read together with Article 2 limits the powers of the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of a Bill or actions taken to amend the Constitution until after the said Bill or action materialises or crystalizes into an actual constitutional amendment;

 

(ii) whether Article 128 of the Constitution as read together with Article 2 limits the powers of the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of a Bill or actions taken to amend the Constitution by virtue of only merely mentioning the word “Bill”; and

 

(iii) whether Article 128 of the Constitution as read together with Article 2 allows the Constitutional Court to wait until the Constitution is mutilated before it assumes jurisdiction to prevent that overthrow.

 

In this regard, the petitioners were seeking, among others, the following reliefs:

 

(i) An order directing the Respondent (the Minister of Justice through the Attorney-General) to undertake wider consultation with the citizens of the Republic of Zambia prior to tabling the Constitution amendment Bill; and

 

(ii) An order to estop the Minister of Justice through the Respondent to halt any action or decision until after wide consultations.

 

The Constitutional Court, after hearing the matter, granted the following reliefs:

 

1. We declare that the decision by the Respondent to initiate a Constitutional amendment process without wider consultation goes against the spirit of Articles 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 61, 90, 91 and 92 of the Constitution.

2. We order that the Respondent complies with the spirit of the Constitution by ensuring a people-driven process led by an independent body of experts including wider consultations with the people.

 

Honourable Members, it is important at this juncture to note that at the time Mr Munir Zulu and Mr Celestine Mukandila filed the petition in the Constitutional Court, there was no Bill tabled in the National Assembly. However, at the time of the judgment, the legislative process in the National Assembly was already underway. As the House will recall, the Hon Minister of Justice presented the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill Number 7 of 2025, on Wednesday, 25th May, 2025. 

 

Hon Members, in his Point of Order, Mr M Anakoka, MP, was asking whether this House was in order to keep quiet when, while it was in the process of discharging its constitutional mandate, another arm of the Government declared the process unconstitutional. He said this in reference to the judgement of the Constitutional Court in the Munir Zulu case. He further stated that this usurpation of powers on such a serious issue has the potential to impact negatively the constitutional order of this country in terms of the separation of powers. 

 

The questions that this part of the Point of Order raise are:

 

(i) whether the Constitutional Court did indeed declare the legislative process of Bill 7 unconstitutional; and

 

(ii) whether the Constitutional Court ursuped the powers the Legislature.

 

I have had the benefit of reading both the majority and minority judgments in the Munir Zulu case. My reading of the Judgment reveals that, with regard to the first question above, the Court did not declare the legislative process in the National Assembly of Zambia in enacting Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, N.A.B 7 of 2025 (Bill 7) unconstitutional. The Court addressed the constitutionality of the process prior to the presentation of Bill 7 in the National Assembly. 

 

Further, the Court ordered that the Respondent complies with the spirit of the Constitution by ensuring a people-driven process led by an independent body of experts including wider consultations with the people (underlining is for emphasis sake). By ordering the Respondent in this manner, the Court was in essence ordering the Respondent to stop the process which was already underway in the National Assembly. I will address this issue more intensely when dealing with the doctrine of exclusive cognizance.

 

Honourable Members, I am aware that there is currently a petition before the Constitutional Court between Isaac Mwanza and the Attorney-General under cause number 2025/CCZ/0013. Among the reliefs being sought in this petition is a declaration that the decision of the Court purporting to determine the procedure process for initiating a constitutional amendment prior to the drafting of a Bill, in the absence of provisions in the Constitution and the law, amounts to unlawful usurpation of legislative authority and executive authority, contrary to Article 62(2) and Article 91(2) of the Constitution as read together with section 2(2)(d) of the Inquiries Act. Therefore, I will not delve into the issue of whether the Constitutional Court has usurped the legislative mandate of the National Assembly as it is sub judice.

 

However, I would like to take this opportunity to provide guidance on the sanctity of the legislative process of this august House. Parliament is vested with the legislative authority by Part VI of the Constitution. Specifically, Article 62 of the Constitution vests legislative authority in Parliament. For avoidance of doubt, Article 62 provides as follows:

 “62. (1) There is established the Parliament of Zambia 

which consists of the President and the National Assembly.

(2) The legislative authority of the Republic is vested 

in and exercised by Parliament.

(3) A person or body, other than Parliament, shall 

not have power to enact legislation, except as conferred by this Constitution.

(4) A member of the National Assembly shall be 

Referred to as a Member of Parliament.”

 

Honourable Members, the National Assembly has a far-reaching freedom to determine and regulate its internal procedures and proceedings. This is referred to as the exclusive cognizance of the House. The privilege of exclusive cognisance derives from both legislation and parliamentary practice.  Article 77(1) of the Constitution empowers Parliament to regulate its own procedure and to make Standing Orders for the conduct of its business. It provides as follows:

 

“Subject to this Article and Article 78, the National Assembly shall regulate its own procedure and make Standing Orders for the conduct of its business.”

Additionally, section 34 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, Chapter 12 of the Laws of Zambia, provides as follows:

 

“34. Neither the Assembly, the Speaker nor any officer shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise of any power conferred on or vested in the Assembly, the Speaker, or such officer by or under the Constitution, the Standing Orders, and this Act.”

 

Honourable Members, the import of Article 77(1) of the Constitution as read together with section 34 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act is that the National Assembly has the power, and exclusive jurisdiction to conduct its internal affairs without interference from any external body, including the courts of law. 

 

There is an abundance of authorities confirming several judicial decisions that the courts have no jurisdiction and cannot interfere with the internal proceedings of the Legislature.

 

In the case of Hem Chandra Sen Gupta and Others Vs. The Speaker of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly Air 1956 Cal 378, 60 Ven 555, the Chief Minister of West Bengal had given notice to move a motion for the West Bengal Legislative Assembly to approve a proposal for the union of the States of West Bengal, and Bihar. Opposed to the merger, the petitioners sought to restrain the Chief Minister from pursuing the motion. The petitioners also sought to restrain the Union of India  from bringing any Bill or legislation in Parliament for the purposes of uniting the two States. In resolving the issue whether court process could be used to stall an internal process of the Assembly, the court observed at paragraph 22 of the judgment as follows:

 

“Under the rules of procedures framed by the Assembly under Article 208, a member was at liberty to bring forward any resolution, provided the rules were observed. It was for the Speaker of the House to allow or disallow such a resolution to be raised or discussed in the House. The courts could not at that stage seek to regulate the procedure of the House and arrogate to itself the powers of the Speaker. If, however, a law was passed or a resolution adopted or a motion carried, which was not in accordance with the Constitution, such a law, resolution, or motion could be declared invalid by the Court.”

 

 

The Court further held at paragraph 23 of the same page that:

 

“The Constitution lays down the respective jurisdictions of the legislatures and the courts. It is the business of the Legislature to make laws and of the Court to administer them. The powers, privileges and immunities of the State Legislatures and their members have been laid down in the Constitution. In such matters and within their allotted spheres, they are supreme and cannot be called in to account by the courts of the land. The courts are therefore not interested in the formative stages of any law. Even where a law has been promulgated, it is not the duty of the courts to act in a supervisory character and rectify the defects on its own motion.”

 

In deciding the Gupta case, the court referred to the English case of the Queen v Lords Commissioners of the Treasury [1872]7Q.B.387, where it was held that the Legislature had the exclusive Cognisance to decide its own affairs. Thus, in the

Gupta case (supra),the court adopted the statement of Blackburn J, as follows:

 

 

“I must observe in saying this that there is not the slightest intention on my part to question the exclusive prerogative of the House of Commons in voting the money. As long as the thing remains to be made a resolution in the House, it could not, I believe, be brought properly before this court. But when the money has been voted, and the money has been granted, and an Appropriation Act has been passed, then it has become an Act of the Legislature, and we must construe it when it comes before us as we should do any other Act.”

 

The import of the dicta of BlackburnJ, cited above, is in effect  that no action can be commenced to challenge a process of the National Assembly, before it is completed  and a decision is made. Thus any challenge, must come after the decision is made. 

 

In addition, in the case of Bradlaugh v Gosset [1884] 12 Q.B.D 271 the court was emphatic when it held that the House of Commons was not subject to the control of the courts in its administration of that part of the statute law which had relation to its internal proceedings. Further, in Hamilton v Al Fayed (1999) 3 ALLER 334, the House of Lords stated as follows:

“The principle is that the courts will not challenge or assault, by any order of their own, an assertion of authority issued by Parliament pursuant to Parliament’s own procedures. This principle extends to acts and decisions of Parliament which are not part of the process of enacting primary legislation (such as the acts of the PCS, CSP and the House of Commons in this case). It flows from the courts recognition of Parliament’s constitutional status as sovereign legislator. Once it has identified the subject matter of a dispute as falling within such process, the court will not proceed.”

 

The House of Lords further stated as follows, on the same page:

 

“It must surely be for Parliament to lay down the procedures which are to be followed before a Bill can become an Act. It must be for Parliament to decide whether its decreed procedures have in fact been followed. It must be for Parliament to lay down and construe its standing orders and further to decide whether they have been obeyed; it must be for Parliament to, in any particular case, dispense with compliance with such orders. It must be for Parliament to decide whether it is satisfied that an Act should be passed in the form and with the wording set out in the Act. It would be impracticable and undesirable for the High Court of Justice to embark on an enquiry concerning the effect or the effectiveness of the internal procedures of Parliament in the High Court or whether in any particular case those procedures were effectively followed.”

 

Honourable Members, in the decision of the Queen’s Bench in Stockdale v Hansard 3 State Tr (N.S.) 748, the court held that the House of Commons had exclusive jurisdiction over its own internal proceedings.

 

Coming back home, the principle of exclusive cognisance was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in the case of Chishimba Kambwili v Attorney- General 2019/CC/009. In acknowledging the principle of exclusive cognisance, the court referred to both Article 77(1) of the Constitution, and section 34 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, at page J31, in the following terms:

 

“We also note that by virtue of Article 77(1) of the Constitution, as read together with section 34 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, … the National Assembly has exclusive power, and jurisdiction over the conduct of its internal affairs.”

 

Hon Members, the learned authors on Parliamentary procedure and practice, M N Kaul and S L Shakdher, in their book entitled Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Seventh Edition, (New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2016) on page 249 state as follows:

 

“Parliament is sovereign within the limits assigned to it by the Constitution. There is an inherent right in the House to conduct its affairs without interference from an outside body.... The House has also collective privilege to decide what it will discuss and in what order, without any interference from a court of law:

 

… It is well known that no writ, direction or order restraining the Speaker from allowing a particular question to be discussed, or interfering with the legislative processes of either House of the Legislature or interfering with the freedom of discussion or expression of opinion of either House can be entertained.

 

…The validity of any proceedings in Parliament cannot be called in question in any court on the ground of any irregularity of procedure.”

 

Honourable Members, it is thus abundantly clear from the foregoing authorities that as regards its internal proceedings, the National Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction and the courts cannot intervene. The reason for this is not farfetched; it is to maintain the separation of powers, so that the National Assembly conducts its matters without any interference from either the Executive or the Judiciary. This ensures that the National Assembly is not hindered in the performance of its duties by busy bodies who can rush to the courts to stop the proceedings of the House. If this absurd situation were to be allowed, the operations of the National Assembly would be paralysed and ultimately, fail to execute its Constitutional mandate.

 

Therefore, Honourable Members, the National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders, 2024, are promulgated by the powers granted to this House by the Constitution. To be precise, Part 14 of the Standing Orders, prescribes the parliamentary legislative process. A process that is not outlined in any piece of legislation.

Having said the foregoing, Standing Order 108 outlines the procedure that this House must follow when a Bill to amend the Constitution is presented. The Standing Order provides as follows:

 

“108(1) In accordance with Article 79 (2) of the Constitution a Bill to amend the Constitution shall not be passed unless – 

 

(a) not less than thirty days before the First 

Reading of the Bill in the Assembly, the text of the Bill is published in the Gazette; and

 

(b) the Bill is supported on Second and Third Reading Stages by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members of the Assembly.

 

Honourable Members, I am also alive to the provisions of Article 5 of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

 

“5 (1) Sovereign authority vests in the people of Zambia, which may be exercised directly or through elected 

or appointed representatives or institutions. 

(2) Power that is not conferred by or under this Constitution on any State organ, State institution, State officer, Constitutional office holder or other institution or person is reserved for the people. 

(3) The people of Zambia shall exercise their reserved power through a referendum, as prescribed.”

 

Further, Article 62(2) and (3) clothes Parliament with legislative power and prohibits any person or body, other than Parliament, to enact legislation. The Article provides as follows:

 

“62

.

(2) The legislative authority of the Republic is vested in and exercised by Parliament. 

(3) A person or body, other than Parliament, shall not have power to enact legislation, except as conferred by this Constitution.”

 

The House will recall that prior to its presentation, the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, National Assembly Bill number 7 of 2025 was published in the Gazette for thirty days as provided for under Article 79(2)(a) and Standing Order 108(1)(a) of the Constitution and Standing Orders, respectively. I wish to point out that there is no proposal in Bill 7 to amend either Article 79 or the Bill of Rights. These are entrenched provisions that require the involvement of the people through a referendum. Therefore, I was of the considered view that Parliament could exercise its legislative authority as conferred upon it by Article 62(2) as read together with Article 5(1) above, which do not require a referendum but is exercised by the Legislature through Members of Parliament who are the people’s representatives. There is nothing in the proposed amendments presented under Bill 7 that require the involvement of Article 5(3) which require a referendum.

 

In this regard, the Bill was properly before the House both in terms of the law and parliamentary procedure. Standing Order 111 outlines the stages of a Bill which include: First Reading, Second Reading, Committee and Third Reading. 

 

At this moment, allow me to briefly explain what happens at each of the legislative stages above, for the benefit of some Members and the general public.

 

 

(i) First Reading

 

This is the presentation of the Bill to the House by the sponsor of the Bill. The sponsor of a Bill may be a Minister or a Private Member. The sponsor simply reads the short title and the objects of the Bill (what the Bill is intended to achieve). 

 

Standing Order 112(3) provides that when a Bill has been read the first time, it shall stand referred to an appropriate Committee for detailed examination. Therefore, after the First Reading, the Speaker refers the Bill to an appropriate Committee for detailed examination. It is important for me to explain that when the Bill has been referred to an appropriate Committee, the Committee produces a programme of work which includes consultative meetings with various stakeholders on their views for or against the Bill. Apart from the identified stakeholders, Members of Parliament and members of the general public are free to make submissions to the Committee within the programme of work of the Committee.

 

This is a consultative process that involves the public and is in line with Article 89(1) of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

 

“89. (1) The National Assembly shall facilitate public 

involvement in the legislative process.”

 

In this way, members of the public are not excluded from the legislative process.

 

The committee reports back to the House on its findings in not less than twenty working days or including such additional time as may be prescribed by the Speaker.

 

(ii) Second Reading 

 

On the day assigned for the Second Reading stage of the Bill, the Minister or Backbencher responsible for the Bill (the sponsor) shall move the motion that the Bill be read the second time. The sponsor is then allowed to explain the objects or the rationale for bringing the Bill. After the sponsor has explained the rationale for bringing the Bill, the Chairperson of the Committee to which the bill was referred presents the report of the Committee including the findings from the various stakeholders, Members of Parliament and members of the public that made submissions to the Committee.

 

After the Chairperson of the Committee presents the Committee’s report, other Members are allowed to debate the Bill. At the end of the debate, a vote is taken for or against the Bill before proceeding to the next stage. If it is a Constitutional Bill, the threshold at this stage is two-thirds of all the Members of the House voting in favour of the Bill. If it is any other Bill, a simple majority suffices. After the Second Reading, the Bill is then referred to a Committee of the Whole House for Committee stage.

 

(iii) Committee Stage

 

The objective of the Committee Stage is to accord the Committee of the Whole House an opportunity to approve the Bill clause by clause. It is important to mention that at this stage, if there is a Member who is not happy with any clause can move an amendment for which he or she has given notice.

 

Amendments are debated and passed using a simple majority whether a Bill is a constitutional one or any other Bill. If a clause has been amended, the Chairperson immediately puts the question that the clause, as amended, stands part of the Bill. Where an amendment is not agreed to the Chairperson orders the original clause to stand part of the Bill. If a Bill is not amended at Committee Stage, it proceeds to the Third Reading Stage.

 

However, if a Bill has been amended at Committee Stage, it proceeds to the Report Stage.

 

(iv) Report Stage 

 

As I have already stated, the Report Stage only occurs when there were amendments during the Committee stage. Further amendments may be made to the Bill at this stage. The amendments at this stage are restricted to minor ones meant to clean up the Bill. 

 

After the Report Stage, the Bill proceeds to the Third Reading Stage.

 

(v) Third Reading

 

At this stage the Speaker puts the question that the Bill be read the third time. There is no debate at this stage. If a Bill is a constitutional one, the threshold for passing this stage is two-thirds of all the Members of the House voting in favour of the Bill. If, on the other hand, the Bill is not a constitutional one, the threshold is a simple majority. After going through the Third Reading the Bill is considered as passed by the House.

 

The Process on Bill 7

 

Honourable Members, without providing all the details of what occurred when the Honourable Minister of Justice presented the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, the procedures outlined in the National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders, 2024, were set in motion. As the House will recall, the Bill was referred to a Select Committee in line with Standing Order 112(3) and the Select Committee began to execute its mandate. In its programme of work, the Select Committee lined up the following stakeholders to be consulted:

 

1. Ministry of Justice;

2. Programme Manager, SADC-PF;

3. Electoral Commission of Zambia;

4. Zambia Law Development Commission;

5. Ministry of Youth, Sport and Arts;

6. Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development;

7. Ministry of Community Development and Social Services;

8. Gender Division – Office of the Vice-President;

9. Ministry of Finance and National Planning;

10. Human Rights Commission;

11. The Judiciary of Zambia;

12. Zambia Statistics Agency;

13. Policy Monitoring and Research Centre (PMRC);

14. Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research;

15. Acton Institute for Policy Analysis Centre;

16. Council of Churches in Zambia;

17. Zambia National Federation of the Blind;

18. Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities;

19. Zambia Conference for Catholic Bishops;

20. GEARS Initiative Zambia;

21. Non-Governmental Gender Organisations Coordinating Council;

22. Girls Gone Political;

23. Zambia National Students Union;

24. Centre for Young;

25. Leaders in Africa;

26. Zambia Civil Liberties Union;

27. Independent Churches Association of Zambia;

28. Alliance for Accountability Advocates Zambia;

29. Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection;

30. Islamic Council of Zambia;

31. Press Association of Zambia;

32. Media Institute of Southern Africa – Zambia Chapter;

33. Women in Law and Development in Africa;

34. Local Government Association of Zambia;

35. Young Women Christian Association;

36. Zambia Institute of Governance and Civil Liberties Advocacy Platform;

37. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions;

38. Measures of Justice and Democracy Foundation;

39. House of Chiefs;

40. Caritas Zambia;

41. Action Aid Zambia;

42. Alliance for Community Action;

43. Disability Rights Watch;

44. Zambia National Women’s Lobby;

45. Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia;

46. Carter Centre Zambia;

47. National Institute for Public Administration – School of Law;

48. Zambian Open University – School of Law;

49. The Oasis Forum;

50. Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes;

51. Transparency International Zambia;

52. Advocates for National Development and Democracy;

53. University of Lusaka -School of Law;

54. Women in Law in Southern Africa (WLSA);

55. The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ);

56. University of Zambia – School of Law;

57. Economic Front;

58. New Congress Party (NCP);

59. Socialist Party (SP);

60. Chapter One Foundation;

61. United Liberal Party;

62. Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD);

63. Patriotic Front (PF);

64. National Democratic Congress (NDC);

65. United Party for National Development (UPND);

66. Party of National Unity and Progress;

67. Patriots for Economic Progress (PEP);

68. Citizens First;

69. Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD);

70. Economic Freedom Fighters;

71. Leadership Movement;

72. New Heritage Party;

73. Golden Party;

74. Zambia Must Prosper;

75. Members of Parliament;

76. Minister of Justice; and

77. Members of the public.

 

It is clear from the above list that the Select Committee intended to consult widely on Bill 7.

 

Honourable Members, Standing Order 121 of the National Assembly Standing Orders, 2024, is instructive on the procedure to be followed when a Member sponsoring the Bill desires to defer or withdraw it. Standing Order 121(1) provides as follows:

 

“A Member who sponsors a Bill may defer or withdraw the Bill at any time by formally writing to the Speaker stating his or her decision.”

 

Honourable Members, as the Select Committee was executing its mandate, on Thursday, 26th June, 2025, my office received communication from the Honourable Minister of Justice informing me of the deferment of Bill 7 of 2025. The reason for the deferment was to allow for further consultations with stakeholders. As the House will recall, I made an announcement on the same day and consequently, suspended the sittings of the Select Committee.  

 

 

I wish to reiterate that according to the National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders 2024, the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 was properly before the House. The deferment that occurred on Thursday, 26th June, 2025, was in accordance with the procedures for deferring a Bill as outlined in the Standing Orders. 

 

It is important at this stage for me to be categorical that, in line with the doctrine of exclusive cognisance which I have extensively traversed in the preceding paragraphs, if the sponsor of Bill 7, that is, the Hon Minister of Justice, decides to proceed with the subsequent stages of Bill 7, this House will resume consideration of the Bill. This is notwithstanding the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Munir Zulu case. This is because the Constitutional Court or any other external body for that matter, cannot arrest a legislative process that has been set in motion and is under consideration in Parliament.

 

I THANK YOU.